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One-way trip: Influenza virus’ adaptation
to gallinaceous poultry may limit its
pandemic potential
Jason S. Long1), Camilla T. Benfield2) and Wendy S. Barclay1)
We hypothesise that some influenza virus adaptations to
poultry may explain why the barrier for human-to-human
transmission is not easily overcome once the virus has
crossed from wild birds to chickens. Since the cluster of
human infections with H5N1 influenza in Hong Kong in
1997, chickens have been recognized as the major source
of avian influenza virus infection in humans. Although often
severe, these infections have been limited in their
subsequent human-to-human transmission, and the
feared H5N1 pandemic has not yet occurred. Here we
examine virus adaptations selected for during replication
in chickens and other gallinaceous poultry. These include
altered receptor binding and increased pH of fusion of the
haemagglutinin as well as stalk deletions of the neur-
aminidase protein. This knowledge could aid the delivery
of vaccines and increase our ability to prioritize research
efforts on those viruses from the diverse array of avian
influenza viruses that have greatest human pandemic
potential.
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Introduction
Avian influenza viruses do not readily infect humans because
of the host range barriers that restrict them at a number of
stages of their replication and transmission cycle [1]. Wild
aquatic birds are the natural hosts for many antigenically
distinct subtypes of influenza, and they occasionally pass
their viruses to domesticated birds, where they may become
endemic [2, 3]. During circulation in gallinaceous poultry
(including chickens, turkeys, and quail; hereafter referred to
as ‘poultry’), influenza viruses undergo genetic adaptation,
which sometimes results in greatly enhanced pathogenicity.
The best described poultry adaptation is the acquisition of a
novel sequence in the haemagglutinin (HA) gene, at the site
where the precursor HA0 protein is cleaved by a host specific
protease into its two components HA1 and HA2. The insertion
of several basic amino acids at this site facilitates cleavage
by proteases – such as furin – that are expressed in a wider
range of tissues, and are often present inside cells [4–8].
This broadens the tissue tropism of the virus, resulting in
dissemination throughout the body, and often rapid death of
the infected bird. So far this type of adaptation to poultry has
only naturally occurred in the H5 or H7 subtypes, resulting in
what is termed a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
(HPAI). HPAI viruses do not seem to emerge in the natural
wild waterfowl host, but if transmitted back to aquatic birds,
the motif can be maintained. In aquatic birds, HPAI infections
vary in outcome but sometimes result in large die offs such as
the 2005 H5N1 outbreak at Lake Qinghai in China, which killed
6,000 migratory birds [9]. The consequence for pathogenicity
in mammals of this poultry adaptation is less clear. In mice
infected with H5N1 virus, the multibasic site (mbs) in HA is a
major determinant of pathogenicity, and in human H5N1
infections reports of virus outside of the respiratory tract
suggest that the mbs has conferred extended tropism [10, 11].
However, in nonhuman primates the mbs had less effect on
the HP phenotype, and addition of mbs to other subtypes of
virus does not always result in high pathogenicity, even in
poultry [12, 13]. Whether an mbs is selected against during
normal transmission between human or wild waterfowl hosts
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is not clear, but this would be one explanation for the lack of
such viruses emerging in non-poultry hosts. Exposure of
humans to poultry is a more likely route for acquisition of an
avian influenza virus than exposure to wild waterfowl.
Therefore understanding the consequence for human infec-
tivity of poultry adaptation of avian influenza viruses is
crucial. In recent years, zoonoses following exposure of
humans to poultry infected with avian influenza viruses have
been documented, including more than 667 people infected
with HPAI H5N1 virus [14], 450 people affected by HPAI H7N7
after a poultry outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003 [15], and
several infections with avian viruses of the H9N2 [16–19],
H6N1 [20], and H10N8 [21] subtypes in China, Taiwan, or Hong
Kong. In spring 2013, a novel H7N9 virus infected at least 135
people in Eastern China, killing 44 of them [22]. In winter 2014
the virus re-emerged with a similarly high fatality rate,
bringing the total number of confirmed cases to 450, including
165 deaths [23]. Chickens are considered to be the source of
infection for most of these human cases. Unlike H5N1 and
some other H7 viruses, the new H7N9 virus has not (yet)
acquired a multi-basic HA cleavage site, and in fact it causes
mild clinical signs in the infected chickens making it hard to
detect and control in wet poultry markets [24]. Yet like H5N1,
this avian influenza virus causes severe disease inmost people
whom it infects, but does not pass readily between them. A
great deal of concern has been expressed in the past decade
about whether avian influenza viruses will mutate to acquire
increased transmissibility between humans. Lack of efficient
human-to-human transmission is what currently spares us
from what might otherwise be a devastating pandemic.
Transmission of influenza virus between humans is
thought to occur by inhalation of respiratory droplets or
aerosols containing infectious virus, or through transfer of
virus from contaminated surfaces [25–27]. In either case, the
virus particles must be shed in adequate amounts, retain
sufficient infectivity as they traverse the physical gap between
one host and another, and initiate infection in the new host
with a small dose. Avian influenza viruses may be compro-
mised at any of these transmission stages and need to acquire
adaptive changes before they can sustain efficient circulation
in humans. Here we describe three different adaptive changes
that are associated with poultry-adapted influenza viruses:
changes to receptor binding by HA, changes to stability of HA
and changes to the stalk length of NA. We argue that some or
all of these adaptations may drive virus evolution in a
direction away from transmissibility between humans.
Adaptation to poultry selects for
mutations in haemagglutinin that affect
receptor binding
It is widely accepted that efficient virus binding to the specific
types of host cell receptors that are abundant in the upper
respiratory tract (URT) of humans is a prerequisite for human
transmission. Most natural strains of avian influenza virus do
not bind well enough to the human receptors to be infectious
at the low doses that might reach the target cells of the next
host [28]. The HA is the viral attachment protein binding
sialic acid sugars, SA, that act as receptors on cell surfaces.
Although HA binds SA with relatively low affinity, the HA
is expressed in hundreds of trimerized copies adorning
the virus particle, thereby increasing the overall avidity.
Relatively small differences in affinity conferred by single or
double amino acid mutations in the HA receptor-binding
site transform into larger avidity changes that can shift the
preference of the HA from one SA type to another [29].
Mutations within the HA receptor binding site that shift
receptor binding preference away from the a2,3-linked sialic
acids (SA) – which are more predominant in birds – to the
a2,6-linked SA abundant in the URT of humans, were present
in the H1, H2, and H3 HA subtype viruses that sparked the
influenza pandemics of the 20th century [30–33] (Fig. 1).
Mutations that alter the receptor-binding specificity affect
transmission between ferrets. The ferret is a widely used
animal model of human influenza, justified by its similar
distribution of SAs to the human URT, and by similar clinical
signs when infected with influenza [34–36]. We showed that
changing two amino acids in the receptor-binding site of a
human H3N2 influenza virus to those found in avian viruses
abrogated transmission, because the avianized virus could not
initiate infection at low doses [37]. Others have reported
similar findings with H1N1 and H2N2 viruses [38, 39].
The chicken glycome (repertoire of glycan sugars) differs
from that of aquatic birds (Fig. 1). Both a2,6- and a2,3-linked
SAs are present in the chicken nasal cavity, upper respiratory
tract, and gut, whereas in ducks a2,3-linked SA predom-
inates [40–43]. During poultry adaptation HA evolves
different SA-binding properties [44], which may actually
Figure 1. Differences in the glycome of influenza hosts drive
changes in influenza HA that alter receptor binding. A: Avian
influenza HA binds to a-2,3-SA glycans presented on a cone-like
structure that predominate in the duck. B: a-2,3- and a-2,6-glycans
are present in the chicken, but their topology may differ from that in
ducks or humans. We hypothesise that influenza HA must adapt to
bind to a differently presented a-2,3-glycan, perhaps by also
acquiring HA glycosylation, and/or to bind to the a-2,6-glycans also
present, the topology of which may differ from the a-2,6-glycans in
humans. C: a-2,6-glycans presented on umbrella-like structures in
the human respiratory tract require the HA receptor binding site to
accommodate their more bulky topology.
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enhance the ability of the virus to infect cells in the human
airway. Strikingly, the HA gene of the 2013 H7N9 virus already
carries a single amino acid change in the receptor binding
pocket, Q226L, that enhances binding to a2,6 SA [22, 45]. This
may account for the higher infection rate of people exposed to
infected poultry than has been previously seen during H7
outbreaks, but it clearly is not sufficient alone to mediate
human-to-human transmission [46]. Indeed, H9N2 influenza
viruses widespread in poultry in Asia for some years also carry
this change, and sporadic human infections have been
documented, though with no evidence of onwards human
spread [16]. Some have postulated that the additional amino
acid change of glycine to serine at residue 228 would be
required for transition to binding to human receptors [30, 31,
46]. However, this has not naturally occurred either in the H7
or the H9 HA in poultry, thus suggesting that the presentation
of SA is different between poultry and humans.
However, other adaptations to poultry that alter the HA:SA
interaction may adversely affect the ability of that HA to
support virus transmission in humans. In particular, acquisi-
tion of glycosylation on the HA head domain is a common
evolutionary change in chicken-adapted avian influenza
viruses that may, via steric hindrance, decrease the strength
of binding between virus HA and cell surface SA [47, 48]. It is
not clear what advantage is brought to the virus in poultry by
decreasing receptor-binding affinity, but one explanation is
that this adaptation may be required to balance other changes
driven by the poultry host (see below and Fig. 3). In
controversial gain of function studies carried out in two
laboratories and published in 2012, HPAI H5N1 viruses were
experimentally generated that acquired transmissibility in
ferrets [49, 50]. Both viruses carried pre-emptive mutations
that enhanced binding to a2,6-SA receptors and simulta-
neously decreased a2,3-SA binding [29, 51]. During ferret
passage, both viruses acquired a further mutation in the HA
head domain that resulted in the loss of glycosylation at a site
close to the receptor-binding site. This is consistent with an
earlier report that showed that the removal of this glycosyla-
tion site (158N), in addition to Q226L and G228S that affect SA
specificity, enhanced replication of a live attenuated H5N1
vaccine virus in the ferret URT and increased its immunoge-
nicity [52]. The loss of HA head glycosylation in ferret
transmissible H5N1 viruses increased virus binding to both
a2,6- and a2,3-SA receptors [53], and suggests that the HA:SA
balance needs to be repaired in the mammalian host to
support transmission. Thus, acquiring HA head glycosylation
in poultry results in a virus that is less likely to be transmitted
in mammals. However it should be noted that, as H5N1 virus
continues to circulate widely amongst avian species, some
natural isolates of H5N1 virus that already lack glycosylation
at HA residues 158–160 have been reported in Egypt,
demonstrating that this potential host range barrier is rather
readily lost [54, 55].
Taken together these observations suggest that, during
outbreaks of avian influenza viruses in poultry, HA sustains
mutations that affect receptor binding, and some of these
may sterically hinder the virus host interaction in ways
presumably advantageous for poultry but deleterious for
transmission between humans. Other mutations that en-
hance binding to human receptors are not on their own
sufficient to enable transformation into a human transmissi-
ble virus [53, 56].
The pH stability of HA affects both
virulence and transmission
As well as mediating receptor binding, HA is the fusogenic
protein of the virus. After HA binds SA receptors on the
host cell surface, the virion enters the cells by endocytosis.
Inside the acidic environment of the endosome, HA under-
goes a conformational change [57, 58], whereby ionisable
residues situated in the stalk region trigger fusion [8, 59–62].
The pH at which HA undergoes this change varies between
different subtypes and strains of virus [63]. Interestingly,
many of the HA proteins from poultry-adapted viruses have
a higher (less acidic) pH for fusion than typical human
adapted virus HAs, making them less pH stable. Indeed
the pH instability of particular HA proteins from HPAI
(previously known as Fowl plague viruses FPV) was noted
many years ago [64, 65]. This may contribute to the HPAI
phenotype, since more recently, Dubois et al. showed that a
H5N1 virus with an unstable HA caused increased pathoge-
nicity in the chicken host [66].
Why might unstable HA proteins, as observed in
poultry adapted viruses, be advantageous to the
virus?
An advantage to the virus of possessing HA that fuses at
relatively high pH is the opportunity to release its genome
from the early endosome rather than waiting for further
endosome maturation. This might give the virus a ‘head start’
to initiate replication before the host cell’s innate response is
activated. Another reason for early escape from the endosomal
pathway is to avoid lysosomal degradation, and/or to evade
the inhibitory effects of innate restriction factors such as
interferon-induced transmembrane protein 3 (IFITM3) that
reside in the late endosomes and inhibit viral fusion [67]
(Fig. 2). In humans and mice, IFITM3 has a crucial role in
limiting influenza-induced morbidity and mortality [68].
Under circumstances of virus propagation where trans-
mission is not required, the advantages conferred by an
unstable HA are evident. Serial passage in either cell
culture [69] or in mice [70, 71] has been shown to select
viruses with HAs that fuse at higher pH, supporting the notion
that this phenotype confers a selective advantage under
laboratory conditions. In addition, a highly virulent PR8
variant carries an HA mutation that elevates fusion pH and
contributes to its virulence in mice [72]. Although recent
reports have identified IFITM3 orthologs capable of restricting
influenza in chickens [68] and in pigs (Benfield et al,
submitted), an intriguing hypothesis is that species-specific
differences in endosomal pH or in the potency or location of
IFITM3 (or other IFITM) proteins may differentially restrict
influenza viruses. Whether such factors underlie the emerging
importance of HA acid stability to virus cross species
transmission (see below) is an area for future study.
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The cost of instability
However, triggering of HA fusion activity at higher pH equates
to virion instability. This comes at a cost during transmission
events, and this cost will be greater when hosts are more
dispersed and successful transmission requires environmen-
tal longevity or resilience. For each particular host species and
transmission mode, the virus must strike a balance between
stability and uncoating. In the primordial influenza reservoir,
the route for influenza transmission between natural water-
fowl hosts is through shared water. Here host population is
less dense, and environmental survival might be a more
stringent driver than early endosome release. Indeed, the
work of Stallknecht demonstrates that environmental stability
is one driver of avian influenza virus evolution, and modelling
by the same group implies that the route of transmission will
influence the pressure on the virus to retain temperature
stability [73, 74]. Moreover, Reed et al. showed that survival of
avian influenza viruses carrying HA destabilizing mutations
in water was compromised, and transmission between
ducks was less efficient. On the other hand mutations that
overstabilized HA were also deleterious in the anseriforme
(duck) host because they attenuated the virus, presumably by
delaying fusion [75]. For terrestrial birds, including poultry,
transmission might occur by the fecal-oral or respiratory
routes. In the crowded poultry house, a virus particle may not
need to survive long in the environment before reaching a new
host: thus benefits of early fusion might outweigh the costs of
instability. This balance between survival in the environment
and efficiency of uncoating inside the cell may be a concept
that applies to other viruses. Pfeiffer’s work on poliovirus also
shows that mutations that decrease stability compromise
environmental survival and transmission although they have
little effect on virus replication in vitro [76].
Why should HA stability be particularly important
for respiratory droplet transmission between
mammals?
Efforts to understand the mutations required for human
transmission of H5N1 avian influenza viruses reached a
controversial climax in 2012 with the generation of two H5N1
viruses with increased transmissibility between ferrets,
Figure 2. Trade-off between intracellular and extracellular effects of
HA stability. A: Poultry-adapted HA virion fuses at a higher pH in the
early endosome and so is less susceptible to restriction by IFITM3,
which resides in the late endosomes. vRNPs leave endosomes
rapidly and traffic to the nucleus for replication. B: Human HA virion
can only fuse at the lower pH in the late endosome and so is more
susceptible to restriction by IFITM3. IFITM3 prevents vRNPs from
escaping the endosome to initiate replication. C: The unstable
poultry-adapted HA is more susceptible to deactivation in the human
transmission environment.
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selected using a combination of reverse and traditional
genetics [49, 50].
The unexpected and consistent result from the H5 ferret
transmission studies was the finding that the acquisition of
airborne transmissibility required not only changes in HA
receptor binding, but also mutations further down the HA
protein, in the stalk region or on the trimer interface, T318I or
H103Y. This discovery reiterated findings of a study published
by Wan, Sorrell, and Perez some years earlier describing an
H9N2 avian influenza virus that became ferret transmissible
with the combination of receptor binding changes and an
amino acid change in the HA stalk region, H192R [77, 78].
Both the T318I and H103Y mutations have been shown to
increase HA stability (i.e. lower fusion pH) [49, 53], and
although not yet proven, the location of the H9N2 H192R
mutation suggests a similar function was required for
adaptation of this virus.
During respiratory droplet transmission, incoming virus
particles must deposit on the apical surface of the respiratory
tract, having traversed the nasal mucosa. Interestingly, studies
in humans have shown this environment as mildly acidic:
measurements indicate a range between pH 5 and 8, with a
mean pH of 6.3 [79, 80]. Thus an unmodified HPAI poultry
H5 virus that lands in the ferret or human nose might be
inactivated by the premature triggering of HA rearrangement
before it can bind and enter its target cell. Put another way,
the dose of incoming virus required to successfully initiate
infection in a new host might be higher than can be achieved
during natural transmission routes if the HA is prone to
instability.
The pH at mucosal surfaces of other host species for
influenza such as the chicken or pig has not to our knowledge
been recorded. The circumstances of transmission – for
example, crowded or disperse hosts – may be what primarily
determines the balance between stability and virulence for
influenza, rather than physiological differences between its
hosts. Even in poultry, viruses that retain HA stability may
transmit through the air more efficiently compared with
isolates with less stable HA, as recently shown with a pair of
H9N2 chicken viruses [74].
Following introduction of a novel virus to humans in a
pandemic, transmissibility becomes increasingly important as
the virus continues to circulate, but the number of susceptible
naive hosts dwindles. After the initial emergence of the swine
origin H1N1 pandemic virus in 2009, further adaptation was
observed in subsequent pandemic waves during circulation
in humans [81]. In HA, mutations that decreased the pH of
fusion from 5.4 to 5.0 were acquired and maintained [82]. This
increased infectivity in ferrets and may well have contributed
to the ability of the virus to continue to circulate in subsequent
years even in the face of accumulating human immunity [83].
Deletions in the neuraminidase stalk
attenuate influenza virus in humans
A second way in which adaptation to poultry might restrict an
influenza virus from becoming transmissible in humans maps
to the neuraminidase gene.
The neuraminidase (NA) presents a tetrameric sialidase
enzyme atop a stalk that extends from the infected cell or
virion particle surface. NA desialates glycans on the cell
surface to aid virus release and on HA and NA glycoproteins to
prevent virion aggregation. In addition, NA removes SA from
molecules in mucus that otherwise act as decoy receptors and
deter virus access to the epithelial cell surface [84, 85].
During adaptation to poultry from an aquatic bird source,
as described above, the HA gene often acquires glycosylation
that occludes the SA-binding site. Concomitantly the NA
protein undergoes truncation of its stalk [86–89]. Stalk
truncation reduces the height of the NA by the deletion of
Figure 3. Poultry adaptations of HA and NA restrict infection of the
human respiratory tract. A: The presentation of chicken cell SA
substrates may differ from that of duck and human cells, requiring
the NA to truncate its stalk in order to efficiently cleave and release
virions from the cell surface. B: 1. HA acquires glycosylation in
poultry, reducing the binding affinity to SA. 2. With unadapted lsNA
the cleavage of SA may outweigh the binding affinity of HA. 3.
Truncation to ssNA reduces cleavage of cell surface SA and
rebalances HA:NA activity. C: lsNA is sufficiently able to cleave SA
substrates present in human mucus, allowing progression through
this innate barrier to initiate infection at the respiratory epithelium.
ssNA is unable to cleave these substrates and virus is therefore
blocked by the human mucus barrier.
J. S. Long et al. Prospects & Overviews....
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between 1 and 35 amino acids. Studies show that this does not
affect the enzyme’s capacity to cleave a soluble sialic acid
substrate [90–92]. However, the truncation may sterically
compromise cleavage of sialic acid on tethered substrates,
such as those on HA of neighboring virus particles or cell
surface receptors, leading to virion aggregation or lack of
release from the infected cells. In addition, an inability to
cleave decoy receptors in multivalent substrates such as
mucus may result in poor access to the apical surface of
respiratory cells. Why stalk truncation arises in poultry is not
yet explained. It may be a rapid way for the virus to rebalance
the HA-NA relationship after acquiring HA glycosylation
(Fig. 3). Alternatively the NA truncation could drive the HA
change, and the shorter stalk of NA may relate to a difference
in the specific abundance or topological presentation of sialic
acids in the target tissues in poultry. In experimental studies,
it is clear that stalk truncation conferred increased virulence
in chickens, and interestingly also in mice [91, 93]. However,
studies in the ferret model suggest that, in these hosts,
truncation of the NA stalk is deleterious for transmissibility,
and there are no natural human viruses that bear truncation in
NA [90, 94, 95].
When the HA from an H5N1 virus (which usually had a
short stalk) was paired with NA from a human-adapted virus
(long stalk) [96, 97], it increased replication in human cells
and transmission in ferrets, reinforcing the concept that
short stalk NA compromises replication in the mammalian
respiratory tract. In one of the two papers describing
respiratory droplet (RD) transmission of HPAI H5N1 virus in
ferrets, the H5 HA gene had been combined with an otherwise
human-adapted genetic backbone that encoded a NA with a
full length stalk [49]. In the other paper H5N1 RD transmission
was achieved with a short stalk NA, but in comparison with
transmission dynamics of pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza
virus, transmission efficacy was low [50].
We recently showed that in ferrets, an otherwise
transmissible pH1N1 2009 virus lost the transmissible
phenotype when it encoded a NA derived from an H5N1
virus naturally truncated by 20 amino acids, and this block
was overcome simply by extending the NA stalk length back to
that seen in human-adapted viruses [90].
In vitro studies suggested that mucus secreted from the
respiratory epithelium acts as an important neutralizing
barrier to influenza virus infectivity because it presents decoy
sialic acid receptors [37, 85]. To counter this barrier the viral
NA can desialate the mucus over time, hence allowing virus to
penetrate to the apical surface of ciliated epithelium below.
However, we showed that virus with a short stalk NA was
compromised in its ability to overcome mucus inhibition, a
deficit that was repaired by extending the stalk length [90].
This suggests that access of the enzyme head to the mucus
substrate is impaired in chicken-adapted viruses with short
NA stalks (Fig. 3). Whether chickens lack the same level of
respiratory mucus or whether the types of sialic acid chains
that adorn it differ from those in the mammalian respiratory
tract is not clear, but this aspect may be worthy of future
attention.
The N9 NA from the recently emerged H7N9 virus
manifests a short five amino acid truncation, whereas the
truncation of NAs from H5N1 viruses tends to be much
longer, usually a 20 aa truncation [22, 98]. Therefore,
whether the N9 NA truncation affects the ability of the virus
to function in the human respiratory tract environment
is not yet clear. This may present a further barrier that
prevents efficient human transmission of the current H7N9
viruses.
Implications of poultry adaptation in HA
and NA for the failure of pre-Pandemic
live attenuated influenza vaccine
Vaccination is the primary measure for control of an influenza
outbreak. However, pandemic vaccines based on avian HAs
such as H5 or H7 that have been tested in phase I trials have
Figure 4. Summary of the reduced pan-
demic potential of poultry-adapted influenza
viruses compared with influenza viruses of
aquatic bird origin. Mammalian host range
barriers that are common to both poultry-
adapted influenza viruses and those adapted
to aquatic birds include HA-binding prefer-
ence, HA stability, and polymerase activity.
Adaptation to the poultry host often results
in the accumulation of additional mutations
including HA glycosylation and NA trunca-
tion, evolving the virus further away from
adaptation to mammals (dotted arrow).
In both cases, zoonotic transmission may
occur, but onward human-to-human trans-
mission does not follow in the absence of
additional adaptations.
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yielded disappointing results. These inactivated vaccines
require larger doses than for seasonal influenza vaccine and
more than one immunization [99]. Live attenuated influenza
vaccines with H5 or H7 HA so far have fared even worse [100].
Several phase I clinical trials were performed using LAIV with
H5 or H7 HAs but an almost total lack of replication in the nose
of recipients resulted in no seroconversion measured either by
hemagglutination inhibition (HI) or neutralization. With
hindsight this result is not too surprising: The basis of
attenuation of the LAIV vaccines is that the core proteins of
the virus are cold-adapted and temperature sensitive [101].
Thus LAIV only replicates in the cooler temperatures of the
nose. However, as discussed above, viruses with avian HA and
NA – particularly if derived from poultry adapted strains – are
highly restricted in the human nose. Even when mutations
were engineered into the H5 HA to increase a2,6-SA binding
ability, the replication of H5 LAIV in ferrets was still low [52].
Egorov and co-workers found that engineering a mutation to
the H5 HA that stabilized against low pH increased replication
in the nose of mice, and enhanced the antibody response
induced by an attenuated virus [102].
Engineering virus with H5 HA combined with a different
(long stalk) NA increased mammalian cell replication
and ferret nasal titres [96]. We recently combined these
strategies by engineering receptor binding and pH stabiliz-
ing changes into a recombinant vaccine virus with H5 HA
and long stalk N1 NA. We found that these changes led to
increased viral shedding from the nose of infected ferrets, to
the extent that contact transmission occurred, and that the
mutations in H5 HA did not compromise the antigenicity
of H5 [97].
The improved immunogenicity of LAIV over inactivated
or subunit AI vaccines suggests fewer doses of a LAIV
vaccine, each made with less virus, would be required;
hence a greater proportion of the population could be
vaccinated [103]. Moreover, increased pH stability and heat
stability appear to go hand in hand, and this will increase
the longevity of the vaccines produced [82]. While it can be
argued that the H5 virus that acquired human transmissi-
bility would necessarily come ready-made with these
adaptive HA and NA mutations, if we wait for nature to
generate the virus, we won’t have time to test the feasibility
and safety of such a LAIV approach in preclinical and
clinical trials.
Thus we propose that LAIV HA stable H5 and H7 vaccines
should be generated and tested under appropriate contain-
ment conditions for their ability to replicate in the URT of
ferrets and then humans. We postulate that these modified
LAIVwill induce antibody and cellular immune responses and
constitute a new pre-pandemic vaccine.
Conclusions and outlook
In summary, adaptation of influenza A viruses in poultry
selects for HAs with additional glycosylation sites that impair
human receptor binding; it also selects for increased pH of
fusion that results in environmental fragility, and NA stalk
length truncation that impairs the virus’ ability to overcome
the mucus barrier (Figs. 1, 2, and 3).
These restrictions combine with the other well characterized
host range restrictions of SA receptor specificity and
inadequate polymerase function that also restrain avian
influenza viruses from crossing the host barrier (Fig. 4). Taken
together, the barriers that a poultry-adapted influenza virus
has to overcome in order to contribute to a new pandemic are
relatively high.
Nonetheless, one certainly cannot exclude that such
barriers can be overcome, particularly bearing in mind the
huge numbers of poultry and the close contact between
humans and poultry in certain world regions. Therefore, it
is important to use this new knowledge to improve our
pandemic preparedness.
Surveillance for risk-assessing the threat from H7N9 [22],
H10N8 [21], or any other emerging avian influenza virus might
include an assessment of the pH stability of the HA and the
ability of theNA to digest human respiratorymucus in addition
to receptor binding characteristics as an early indicator of the
likelihood of its transmission potential [104]. Gabbard et al.
recently showed that the HA of the 2013 H7N9 virus displayed
a high fusion pH typical of poultry viruses, and we suggest
that this, combined with its NA stalk length truncation, may
explain its lack of human transmission, despite the receptor-
binding site mutation that it already carries [105].
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